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Book Review 
 
Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright (2018): Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of our 
Planetary Future, London: Verso. 
 
Reviewed by Chris Goldie 
Formerly Senior Lecturer, now Honorary Research Fellow, Sheffield Hallam University 
 
Abstract 
Climate Leviathan provides an account of the possible trajectories of climate politics, arguing that 
adaptation to rather than mitigation of global warming is the most likely scenario, a planetary 
management organised on the basis of new forms of political sovereignty. It is argued that Climate 
Leviathan’s ambition to project sovereignty globally and on the basis of existing social relations will 
face enormous problems, not least because of its incapacity to address issues of climate justice, 
equality and solidarity. Conversely, a non-capitalist form of global leviathan based on a change of 
policy in China and revolutionary upheaval in Asia would be very effective, but a reversal of its 
strategy of economic growth may have unacceptable political costs for the PRC. Fundamentally, 
however, Climate Leviathan embraces neither capitalist nor non-capitalist forms of global sovereignty 
but argues - following Benjamin’s critique of sovereign power responses to the catastrophe of the 
1930s - that only a conception of a politics of counter-sovereignty can be emancipatory and just.    
 
 
As the title of this book implies, its concern is not with the science of climate change, nor directly and 
in any detail with the social and economic consequences of undiminished global warming, but with a 
particular form of sovereign power. The authors argue that in the absence of an alternative based on 
principles of equality, solidarity and justice the power deployed on a global scale to manage the 
process of adaptation will be of an unprecedented ferocity. Climate Leviathan hardly considers the 
possibility that global warming might be halted – so called mitigation – and accepts, as other recent 
accounts have, that adaptation to the realities of a warming climate is now inevitable. The book’s 
premise is that this will most likely occur in a world within which capitalist social relations remain, its 
pessimism framed, nevertheless, in Gramscian terms: recognising the processes at work in order that 
they might be challenged realistically; requiring of the left that it abandon fantasies about the awesome 
power of current resistance movements and develop new theories, strategies and practices appropriate 
to the magnitude and global reach of the dangers faced. 
 
Much of value has been written about the history and politics of climate change but Climate 
Leviathan, whilst broadly sympathetic to the approach of this work, is dissimilar and is best 
understood in the context of recent ‘catastrophe’ literature, such as the writings of Susan Buck-Morss 
and Enzo Traverso, in which political philosophy and critical theory are the dominant modes of 
analysis. Indeed, Geoff Mann’s previous book might even be considered a companion piece to this co-
authored volume: an account of Keynesianism and the broader historical context of the emergence of 
political economy in the wake of the French Revolution, presenting the novel thesis that Hegel was the 
first Keynesian. In all of this literature Thomas Hobbes, author of Leviathan, features, but the key 
figures are Carl Schmitt, Nazi jurist and proponent of the concept of the ‘state of exception’ as the 
underlying principle of sovereign power; and Walter Benjamin, whose writing between 1921 and 1940 
took Schmitt’s concept and reversed it. If Schmitt contended that the declaration of a state of 
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exception was the necessary sovereign act in order to overcome the chaos of civil war - the basis of his 
support for the Nazi destruction of the Weimar Republic – Benjamin argued that this state of 
exception already existed and was the problem to be overcome, sovereign power being the force 
commanded by the state and the violence it was ready to employ. 
 
By focusing on sovereign power as the means to understand contemporary political responses to 
climate change Mann and Wainwright place these within a long historical trajectory, beginning with 
the birth of political modernity at the end of the 18th century. The first chapter is principally devoted 
to establishing two arguments. Firstly, that the effort to defend capitalist social relations in the context 
of a rapidly warming world will lead to changes in the form of sovereignty, tending towards 
techniques of government and modes of authority rescaled to a global level. Secondly, that a theory 
capable of grasping this development will necessarily have to join together two philosophical 
traditions: the Marxist critique of political economy, initiated by Marx and extended by Gramsci and 
Poulantzas; and theories of sovereignty first produced by Hobbes, elaborated upon by Carl Schmitt, 
critically appropriated and challenged by Walter Benjamin and, most recently, discussed in the light of 
contemporary political crises by Giorgio Agamben. 
 
Whilst this attempt to combine theories of sovereign power with Marxism is not without problems it 
does introduce a novel historical dimension to the discussion about planetary crisis, not evident 
elsewhere. There is no explicit attempt to do this but - because the debate about sovereign power to 
which it alludes is closely associated with the protracted wars and political crises of the interwar 
period - historical comparisons inevitably arise. Schmitt, for example, considered a sovereign 
decision, with its imposition of a ferocious dictatorial regime based on no legal or ethical grounds but 
producing its own legitimacy, as a desirable means of ending the chaos of a fractured liberal society. 
Benjamin in contrast understood the “state of emergency” as itself the catastrophe rather than the 
means to end it, while at the same time arguing that a dramatic response was necessary: a revolution, 
defined by him as the application of an “emergency break” on the calamitous movement of history. 
The book embraces Benjamin’s response and it follows that the main concern of Climate Leviathan is 
not climate change per se but the catastrophic modes of sovereignty that will arise in order to manage 
adaptation to its effects, although in contrast to the 1930s now deployed at a global level. One of the 
most interesting aspects of the book is its focus on the forms of planetary sovereignty liable to emerge 
in the wake of climate change crisis, each examined in terms of its viability but also in relation to the 
principles of climate justice.  
 
The book outlines four ideal-type social formations that might arise in order to manage climate 
adaptation, two of which are based on the continued existence of capitalism: Climate Leviathan and 
Climate Behemoth; two premised on non-capitalist social relations: Climate Mao and Climate X. In 
each of these the mode of production and its social relations are overdetermined by different forms of 
political authority and conceptions of the political. Thus, Climate Leviathan involves a putative 
solution to global warming in the form of a series of opportunities for capital: trade in emissions 
permits, ‘green’ business, nuclear power, catastrophe bonds, carbon capture and storage, and 
geoengineering; but it also and more fundamentally depends on the exercise of sovereign authority 
over territory beyond the nation state, controlling access to fresh water, strategic technologies, flows 
of climate refugees, and population size, constructing a planetary-wide machinery of regulation and 
surveillance, and creating a draconian regime, the legitimacy of which is proclaimed as a mission to 
‘save the planet’. 
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Whilst such a declaration of a sovereign state of exception for the purposes of saving civilization is 
reminiscent of National Socialism, Mann and Wainwright argue that in its current form it is more 
comparable to Keynesianism as it developed in response to the economic and political crises of the 
1930s. Mann has argued in his earlier book on the politics of Keynesianism that the latter’s aims were 
complex: regarding capitalism as a necessary arrangement if civilization was to be preserved it also 
produced an imminent critique of liberalism, accepting its standpoint but questioning its capacity to 
manage society. Although writing from the left Mann offers a generous account of Keynesian thought, 
from Hegel’s commentary on the French Revolution to Keynes himself in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of Climate Leviathan is that, for numerous reasons, a Keynesian solution 
is not available in the form taken in the interwar period: such a strategy requires a sovereign nation 
state, but changes in political and economic sovereignty on the territorial level mean that the state’s 
capacity to manipulate cross-border flows of capital, goods and services has been eroded; the 
financialisation of the economy has enabled fast, unregulated, speculative movements of capital, 
making Keynesianism volatile and unstable; and a Keynesian strategy is or has been heavily 
dependent on material throughput, a problem for any approach requiring a reduction in consumption 
(pp. 118-120).  
 
One of the dilemmas to which this book draws attention is that green Keynesianism remains, despite 
its obvious limitations in the world we now inhabit, very attractive to the left. Following the crisis of 
2007-08 a wide range of centrists and progressives considered a green strand to be vital in their 
advocacy of a global recovery through boosting aggregate demand. This diverse and otherwise 
incompatible group included the left critic Susan George, Keynesian economists Joseph Stiglitz and 
Thomas Piketty, and Obama economic advisor Lawrence Summers (pp. 109-111). Progressive and 
left-wing critics and activists may not recognise the term but they are frequently advocates of Climate 
Leviathan, through their embrace of green Keynesianism and exemplified by their demand for action 
from elite institutions and intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. There are complex strategic issues at stake in the left conducting their 
politics in this way, the authors argue: protesters at the COP21 meeting in Paris in 2015 demanded that 
any agreement go much further than it was likely to do, but this constituted only “a vague and limited 
critique of the international climate politics regime”, and was tantamount to an endorsement of the 
latter (p. 164). This is a real problem, they argue, and represents an as yet inadequate politics of 
climate justice, but it is one to which there are no clear solutions.    
 
It is intriguing that Climate Leviathan’s prospectus offers a form of draconian sovereign power, a 
regime of ferocious planetary management, but its advocates are from the progressive and liberal wing 
of politics. This is interesting because it invites comparison with the politics of neoliberalism of the 
last two decades and the extent to which its new modes of governmentality have been associated with 
social democratic or putatively progressive parties. The implication is that the exercise of sovereign 
power, with all of the force and violence that follows in its wake, is not only the act of the fascist, 
dictatorial regimes of the past: “the act of deciding the exception - determining what is crisis and what 
is not – is the sovereign backstop to modernity, even in its national-popular, democratic forms” (p. 
22).  
 
Mann and Wainwright argue, however, that the fundamental problems of climate change cannot be 
addressed by “liberal economic reason”, because within the latter’s episteme or “horizon of thought” 
considerations of political economy are entirely absent. In such circumstances all attempts at 
adaptation will certainly perpetuate and increase gross inequalities, the poor and those most vulnerable 
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to “socionatural catastrophe” will be required to adapt, whilst a genuine politics of adaptation able to 
confront capitalist social relations will be ignored. What can be expected will be an exponential 
growth in climate refugees, the persistence of an “apocalyptic narrative of a world overrun by masses 
of unrooted people”, which will contribute to Climate Leviathan’s “securitisation” measures, outlined 
at various points in the book as involving unprecedented levels of control and surveillance with the 
constant presence of force and violence. 
  
The complexities and contradictions in the extension of sovereign power from the nation state to the 
level of planetary governance is explored, with a discussion of its many historical antecedents. Kant’s 
idea of cosmopolitanism was conceived in 1795, in the wake of the Haitian Revolution and offered as 
a critique of European colonialism, slavery and war (p. 135); more recently and particularly since 
1945 the notion of world government has been posited as a solution to the catastrophe of war and its 
now immensely destructive potential. If the logic of the latter position is that the prospect of nuclear 
annihilation would be a spur towards international cooperation for peace there is, however, a converse 
interpretation: the control by the global hegemon of the most recent generation of space-based 
weaponry, the development from these of projects for atmospheric geoengineering, and large-scale 
carbon capture and storage involving massive geological engineering, will all further the development 
of Climate Leviathan; this is not the cosmopolitanism envisaged by Kant, equated with the “ ‘right to 
the earth’s surface which the human race shares in common’ ” (p. 134), but a terrible form of 
domination. If this particular arrangement of planetary adaptation does prevail then it will perpetuate 
the catastrophe within which the world is enmeshed, but when placed in the context of the other ideal-
type social formations discussed the future looks more complicated if not necessarily more optimistic. 
Climate Leviathan is premised on planetary-level sovereignty, effectively “a political and geographical 
extension of the rule of the extant hegemonic bloc: the capitalist Global North”. The authors consider 
this most likely and that the “waning US-led, liberal capitalist bloc will collaborate with China to 
create a planetary regime”, at the same time requiring approval for the project from India and other 
nations formerly excluded from global governance (pp. 31,32). 
 
Ensuring Chinese support complicates the role of capital in this regime of global sovereignty, but the 
authors consider an alternative scenario for China and for the populations most at risk from global 
warming, those living “mainly in South and East Asia, between Pakistan and North Korea. Asia is, 
they argue, the home of most people in the world as well as the centre of capital’s economic 
geography, and it might be expected that “climate-induced social turbulence [will] combine in a region 
with an enormous, growing capacity to reshape the consumption and distribution of the world’s 
resources” (p. 43). The potential for revolutionary change in this region the authors define as Climate 
Mao. This is, they say, another incarnation of Climate Leviathan, except not the version of political 
modernity associated with liberalism but, conversely, the “end of the red thread running from 
Robespierre to Lenin to Mao….  Climate Mao expresses the necessity of a just terror in the interests of 
the future of the collective, which is to say that it represents the necessity of a planetary sovereign but 
wields this power against capital” (p. 38). 
 
 Mann and Wainwright note that such a sovereign power would have a distinct advantage in 
comparison to liberal democracy, particularly in its ability to “coordinate massive political-economic 
reconfigurations quickly and comprehensively”. There is much enthusiasm for this authoritarian, 
decisive, state-led response to climate change on the left. This was the position taken by Giovanni 
Arrighi, Mike Davis expresses similar sentiments, as does, most cogently, Minqi Li.  There is of 
course the problem of this not being the trajectory currently endorsed by the Chinese Communist 
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Party, that its commitment to economic development will increase emissions dramatically, and that 
any reversal in its policy would likely have unaffordable political consequences, given that the basis of 
the state and its ruling elite’s legitimacy is in economic growth. Even so, the authors recognise how 
effective the Chinese state can be when it exercises its full regulatory powers: re-engineering the air 
quality of Beijing during the 2008 Olympics; blocking General Motors’ sale of the Hummer to 
Sichuan Tenzhong heavy Industrial machinery in 2010 because of its emissions levels, effectively 
killing the vehicle. These were political achievements unimaginable in a liberal democracy and give 
an indication of what would be possible if China was both a global hegemon and transformed through 
revolutionary pressure (p. 40). The Maoist revolutionary tradition exists still in much of Asia and is 
officially remembered in China itself, but the Chinese Communist Party remains committed, for the 
moment at least, to the building of a capitalist Climate Leviathan. The authors consider nevertheless 
the potential for Climate Mao across Asia, under Chinese leadership, as “millions of increasingly 
climate-stressed poor people” face an imminent catastrophe abetted by the political structures they 
confront. 
 
If Climate Mao has some potential in Asia the world’s core capitalist countries are haunted by the 
spectre of reactionary conservatism, one form of which is Climate Behemoth. Hobbes’ concept of 
Behemoth had signified the masses and anarchy, embodied for him in the English state of the 
Commonwealth era; Schmitt understood it as the force to which the declaration of a sovereign 
exception must respond; Franz Neumann used the idea to analyse  the workings of the Nazi state.  
Mann and Wainwright find evidence in the USA of its characteristic forms of reactionary populism in 
climate change denial, partly led and funded by the capitalist class fraction associated with fossil fuels, 
allied to subaltern groups amongst the proletariat who perceive climate change adaptation as a threat 
to their jobs and to cheap energy as well as a means to empower elites. Across the world similar 
populist right- wing movements have grown, energised by different issues such as immigration and 
maintaining privileges for racial or religious groups, but in most cases, also, the rejection of 
international agreements to address climate change. The authors don’t consider that there is a social 
base amongst these varied political movements for a transnational alliance, but they are a force for 
obstruction because wherever they appear they oppose “the legitimacy of a distinctly international 
political sphere” (p. 45). Mann and Wainwright consider that, ultimately, Climate Behemoth is too 
incoherent and contradictory to offer a challenge to the liberal capitalist leviathan, after which they 
turn towards Climate X and the possibility of equality, solidarity and justice in the management of 
climate change. 
 
Quite early in the development of the book’s argument the authors state that the “momentous socio-
ecological transformation” now occurring is “best grasped as a dangerous, conjunctural moment of 
transition in the planet’s natural history”, one that requires above all an adequate political response. 
But, they go on, this cannot be “merely a transformation in politics - more representative 
proceduralism, for example, or more precautionary environmental policy-making – but a 
transformation of the political”. This involves asking “not only what political tools, strategies, and 
tactics” might be needed but “what conception of the realm of the political might render such tools, 
strategies and tactics imaginable” (p. 28). Possible answers to these questions are discussed through 
the concept of Climate X. To imagine this new realm of the political is not easy, however, and the left 
is drawn towards Climate Leviathan “because the further consolidation and expansion of extant power 
structures would seem to be the only structures of scale, scope and authority” capable of attending to 
an otherwise bleak future. In particular many on the left are convinced that Climate Mao is the 
“planetary sovereign… capable of [taking] the emergency measures needed to save life on Earth” and 
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that “democracy as we know it… seems profoundly inadequate to the problems that lie ahead (pp. 
181, 182). Whilst the left might be inclined to support a just, sovereign terror able to act with 
necessary force, modern liberalism is also dismissive of the capacity of democracy to preserve 
planetary civilization. The “multitude”, the “mob”, the “rabble” are very old fears, spectres threatening 
“to destroy not only the bourgeoisie, but the entire order it understands as civilization” (pp. 182, 183). 
Mann and Wainwright offer, therefore, a critique of the conception of politics associated with liberal 
democracy and Keynesianism, but also of the strategies advocated by Marxists such as Mike Davis 
and Giovanni Arrighi. Although the former aims to preserve capitalism and the latter are resolutely 
anti-capitalist, both endorse the necessity of a sovereign power, which the authors of Climate 
Leviathan do not, and this, ultimately, is the principle upon which the book is based. The outline of the 
political alternative - Climate X - is not developed in detail. The authors say they “cannot claim to 
know what form it might take”, but “whatever form it takes, it has the extraordinary merit attached to 
that which is absolutely necessary. We must create something new. More of the same is not an option” 
(p. 173). They do, nevertheless, provide some guidelines to different ways of thinking. They draw an 
extremely fruitful parallel with an earlier moment of putatively immanent catastrophe, the late fifties 
and sixties, when Marxist political critique was reenergised and the arena for the enactment of radical 
politics was expanded. The principle of solidarity and how it should animate the politics of climate 
justice is thoroughly discussed, particularly as it relates to the concepts of sovereignty and counter-
sovereignty. Carl Schmitt had argued in The Concept of the Political that “universal solidarity is an 
oxymoron”. Any “properly political entity, including a state, is irreducibly constituted in enmity; for 
Schmitt, there is no ‘us’ without ‘them’” (p. 177). The authors reject this division, because of the 
terrible forms of nationalism, racism and violence it has rationalised in the past but also recognizing 
the extent to which forms of “planetarity” associated with Climate Leviathan will depend on such 
distinctions: the forfeiting of ‘other’ peoples, communities and territories, making the sovereign 
decision regarding who has to be sacrificed in the universal interest.  
 
The politics of Climate X is not clearly identified in Climate Leviathan, except through the contention 
that it will necessarily be both anti-capitalist and a politics of counter-sovereignty, embracing the 
approaches of those emancipatory movements with Marxist roots and the “ways of being” of 
indigenous and colonized peoples whose “long historical experience” in struggle against capital and 
the sovereign state are invaluable. Although the final chapter is a little provisional this shouldn’t 
detract from the argument presented throughout the book, which is that capitalism is overdetermined 
by the political forms of sovereign power and that any attempt to challenge the former is inextricably 
connected to the latter. This was Benjamin’s insight in the interwar years when confronted by that 
era’s catastrophe; our current catastrophe, rescaled to the planetary level, bears comparison.  
By far the most powerful and sustained critique within the book is of Climate Leviathan in its 
capitalist form. In particular, Mann and Wainwright’s discussion of this in relation to the left and 
progressive enthusiasm for green Keynesianism gives a real insight into contemporary dilemmas. 
Even though the authors are not advocates for Climate Mao they provide a more than reasonable 
defence of the evident capacity of a state socialist power elevated to global hegemon for the exercise 
of decisive and effective climate politics, as well as offering a perspective on the potential for 
revolutionary change in Asia. Many will continue to think that this type of solution is the world’s last, 
best hope, but it’s still important to consider, as Climate Leviathan does, how sovereign power might 
operate in such circumstances, and the alternative: a concept of the political based on principles of 
counter-sovereignty.       
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